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CENTENNIAL PANELt
TWO DECADES OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY:
EVALUATING EQUAL PROTECTION FOR WOMEN
PANELISTS
DEBORAH BRAKE*
DONNA LENHOFF*
SHARON ELIZABETH RusH***
ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER"
ANN SHALLECK* **
PROF. SHALLECK I am Ann Shalleck and I teach here at the
Washington College of Law. I welcome you to this Centennial Panel.
This year is the 20th anniversary of Craig v. Boren,' the Supreme
Court case that announced intermediate scrutiny as the level of
scrutiny to be applied in evaluating conditions claimed to constitute
sex discrimination.2 First, "thank you" to my colleague, Nancy
Polikoff, who came up with the idea for this panel as a way to exam-
ine the constitutional doctrine studied in the first-year classroom as a
question of both constitutional theory and practice. This case was a
part of a strategy developed in the 1970's to bring constitutional
scrutiny to conditions of inequality and oppression in women's lives.4
tEditor's note: The following is an edited transcript with annotations of a panel discussion held
in honor of the Centennial Celebration for the Washington College of Law. The panel was
held on April 8, 1996 at the Washington College of Law of American University. After this
panel was held, the Supreme Court decided the VMtcase onJune 26,1996.
Senior Counsel at the National Women's Law Center.
General Counsel and Director of the Work and Family Programs, Women's Legal Defense Fund.
Professor, University of Florida, College of Law.
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
***-* Professor of Law and Director, Women & the Law Program, Washington College of Law,
American University.
1. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that statistical evidence of incidents of drunken driving
among males and females was insufficient to support gender-based discrimination arising from
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.29% beer to males under the age of 21 and females
under the age of 18).
2. Id at 197 (holding that statutory ciassifications based on gender must serve important
governmental interests and must be substantially related to those interests).
3. Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
4. BARBARA ALLEN BABcocK, ANN E. FREEDmAN, SusAN DELLER Ross, WENDY WEBsmT
WlLIAMS, RHODA COPELON, DEBORAH L. RHODE AND NADINE TAuB, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW: HISTORY, PRAcTIcE, AND THEORY 161-63, 191-211 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing Craig v.
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That strategy arose out of a complex social and political movement,
that we then called the women's movement. Constitutional litigation
strategies developed in and were part of the conflicts within the
movement at that time. Craig v. Boren5 was a significant legal devel-
opment, a piece of political strategy and social theory carried out by
lawyers and activists."
Since that case was decided, there has been continued litigation,
continued development of constitutional doctrine, and also contin-
ued social and political development within what we now call the
feminist movement.7 Those developments have been shaped by
lawyers both within and outside those movements, by judges at all
levels of the federal judiciary, and by the many activists who have
continued to struggle to address issues of inequality and oppression
within our society.8 Today this panel we will examine the develop-
ment of intermediate scrutiny since Craig and its implications for the
lives of women.
We have on the panel litigators both who are also activists, who, in
their daily work with this constitutional doctrine, see both its possi-
bilities and its limitations, and who seek to restrict the limitations and
extend the possibilities. We also have academics, who, in their teach-
ing and writing about this doctrine-and their involvement in
litigation, too-see other aspects of its possibilities and its limitations.
First, we will hear from Donna Lenhoff, General Counsel and Direc-
tor of the Work and Family Programs at the Women's Legal Defense
Fund, where she has been for almost twenty years struggling against
sex discrimination and making great gains. Next to her is Deborah
Brake, Senior Counsel at the National Women's Law Center, where
she also has been very active litigating these issues. Donna will give
some background on the current state of the intermediate scrutiny
doctrine, how we got here from Craig v. Boren,9 and the issues we face
Boren and the establishment of the intermediate standard of review).
5. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
6. SeeDONALD G. MATHEWS &JANE SHERRON DE HART, SEx, GENDER AND THE PoLrrIcs OF
ERA. A STATE AND THE NATioN 141 (1990) (asserting that in 1982 supporters of Craig v. Boren
continued to seek the Equal Rights Amendment).
7. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (holding that
a state- supported university violated the Equal Protection Clause by limiting enrollment to
women, thus denying qualified men admission); United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia,
116 S. Ct. 2264, 2329 (1996) (holding that the Commonwealth of Virginia committed an equal
protection violation by maintaining exclusively male military colleges).
8. See, e.g., JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN
397-407 (1991) (summarizing relevant case law and other factors important to women's rights
in United States history between 1963 and 1990).
9. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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twenty years after the doctrine was established." Debbie will analyze
differing interpretations of the intermediate scrutiny standard as
enunciated by the Supreme Court." Seeing the lower federal courts'
handling of intermediate scrutiny will give us some perspective on
the ways that doctrine is not only enunciated at the Supreme Court
level, as most of us have studied it in law school, but becomes reality
in peoples' lives through the actions of judges at different levels of
the federal judiciary." Sharon Rush is a professor of law at the Uni-
versity of Florida and has visited with us as a professor at the
Washington College of Law, and at Cornell. She writes and teaches
about feminist theory and constitutional law. Sharon will look at the
intermediate scrutiny doctrine regarding sex discrimination for other
groups, principally gays and lesbians seeking constitutional scrutiny
of their claims of discrimination and oppression." Finally, Elizabeth
Schneider, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and a Visiting
Professor at Harvard Law School, and long-term activist in the
women's movement, who teaches Civil Procedure, Constitutional
Law, Women and the Law, and Battered Women and the Law will
offer some concluding observations on the past and future of inter-
mediate scrutiny.4 Donna.
MS. LENHOFF: When I was in law school twenty-five years ago, it
was a basic tenet of feminist legal doctrine that what we wanted was
strict scrutiny for sex discrimination.'5 And here we are twenty-five
years later, and we have not gotten strict scrutiny for sex discrimina-
tion.'" We have got an awful lot of things that are not quite strict
scrutiny. And we have a shot at getting strict scrutiny right at the
moment. I want to give you a little bit of the context and the back-
ground to explain where we are. But let me start with the news.
10. See infrapp. 8-13 (comments of Donna Lenhoft).
11. See infra pp. 13-21 (comments of Deborah Brake).
12. See infra pp. 13-21.
13. Because of a copyright conflict, Sharon Rush's comments are not included in this
transcript. For a commentary by Professor Rush about this panel, please see Sharon Rush,
Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6AM. U.J. GENDER& L. 41(1997).
14. See infra pp. 21-26 (Comments of Professor Elizabeth Schneider).
15. See Karen Lazarus Kupetz, Note, Equal Benefits, Equal Burdens: "Skeptical Scrutiny" for
Gender Classifications after United States v. Virginia, 30 LOY. L. L. REV. 1333, 1361 (1997)
(describing how now -Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg began paving the way for gender- based
strict scrutiny in her brief for Reed v. Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
16. Sep, ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, The Legal Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment in RIGHTS OF
PASSAGE: THE PAST AND FuTuRE OFTHE ERA 97, 100-101 (Joan Hoff-Wilson, ed., 1986) (stating
that the Supreme Court applied a strict-scrutiny analysis to a gender classification in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-88 (1973), however, it backed down and ultimately adopted a
"middle-tier" scrutiny in Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 197 (1976)).
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When Nancy [Polikoff] called way back last fall with the idea of this
panel, the Supreme Court had not yet agreed to review the decisions
from the Fourth Circuit in the VM case, the Virginia Military Insti-
tute case. So I was thinking what an interesting academic exercise, to
review intermediate scrutiny and its impact.
But in the intervening six months, this has turned into a very real
question because the Court granted certiorari and has now heard
arguments on the question of the constitutionality of a state-run,
essentially a separate and unequal military institution run by a state
for women, not equal to another military institution run by that same
state that is reserved for men only. That is the issue presented in
VMA.'s We now have the consequences and the importance of this
issue right before us in not at all an academic way. This is a very "real
world" problem.
As of course you remember, the historic equal protection doctrine
was that legislative classifications only had to be "rationally related"9
to a governmental purpose. And as late as 1948, the Supreme Court
applied that standard of equal protection review to a sex classifica-
tion.' In Goesaert v. Cleary,2' the Court upheld a Michigan law that
prohibited women from serving behind a bar unless their husbands
or fathers owned the bar.' In that case, I guess, women were suffi-
ciently protected by the legality of their husbands or fathers owning
the bar2 -- regardless, of course, of whether the husband or father was
physically present. But the Court said it is rational; because the state
has an interest in protecting women.2 That is the end of the analysis,
17. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), affd 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.
1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The VM! case was decided subsequent to this panel
discussion. The Supreme Court held in June of 1996 that VMI's exclusion of women violated
the Equal Protection Clause.
18. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1232.
19. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (applying the
rational basis test to a legislative classification in a NewYork traffic regulation).
20. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
21. Id.
22. The Court noted:
The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed
as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not
preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such
matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic... . The Constitution does not require
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it
requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards.
Id. at 466 (citations omitted).
23. See id.
24. Id
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basically. It is rather amazing to think that it was only in the early
'70s when such a revolution had occurred, that the Court no longer
could consider so easy an analysis.
And it was early in the 70's, first, in 1971 in the Reed, case, and
then in 1973 in the Frontiero' case, which were the cases that next
present the question of how to review sex based classifications, that
the Court applied a standard much higher than simple rational basis
review.'
In the interim, of course, the doctrine that race-based classifica-
tions are inherently suspect and therefore must be given strict
scrutiny had become well established in both the Court "psyche" as
well as in the public "psyche." Not only that, but a strategy-which
now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and other early feminist legal
theorists were the prime architects-was developed, that sex-based
classifications ought to be treated the same as race-based classifica-
tions for equal protection purposes." This idea had gotten pretty far
as well.' Indeed, if you apply the criteria that the Court used to
determine that race and ethnic origin ought to be suspect classifica-
tions to the classification of gender, you see that it is hard to come up
with much of a distinction.
First, the Court in the race-based classification cases pointed out
that race was an immutable characteristic with no relationship to
ability." This is, of course, also true for sex.-
25. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (holding that an automatic preference for males
in choosing between two equally qualified people to administer an estate violates equal
protection).
26. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (striking down a statute that
classified on the basis of sex for the sole purpose of administrative convenience).
27. See DEFEIS, supra note 16, at 100-101.
28. One way they asserted this was through advocating the Equal Rights Amendment. See
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TuL. L. REv. 451, 474 (1978) (arguing
that the Equal Right Amendment would ease the court's hesitation in giving a higher scrutiny
for sex discrimination).
29. See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073,
1083-84 (1983) (proposing that use of sex-based actuarial data would be unlawful if race-based
actuarial data were unlawful under Title VII, which places sex-based distinctions on equal
footing with race-based distinctions); see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682 (agreeing with the
proposition that classifications based on sex are similar to race-based classifications in that both
are suspect).
30. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (noting that race was an
immutable characteristic that did not affect people's ability to serve on juries); Fulliove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (reiterating that race should be
irrelevant in government decisions and that no government decisions should be based on
immutable characteristics).
31. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (commenting that both sex and race are immutable charac-
teristics).
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The second criterion, that people of color have a long history of
discrimination even unto the present; also is true of gender." Third,
people of color were underrepresented in the political process, and
the same is true for women." And indeed, those three major criteria
apply not only to gender, but to sexual orientation, to illegitimacy,'
and to a number of other classifications that the court might be
somewhat hesitant to extend "suspect classness" (if you will) to.
There is an apparent exception. Actually, one of the considerations
that applies to race and ethnic origin that does not apply to gender is
minority status. But it is not really clear that minority status is re-
quired in order to get to suspect classification. For example, the
Court recently held in Adarand,"' the affirmative action decision of
last Term, that whites are entitled to strict scrutiny-that is, that
discrimination against whites on the basis of race was entitled to strict
scrutiny.' Obviously, whites in this country-at least in the current
demographics-are not a minority. So having minority status is not
necessarily required of the protected group.
The strategy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg when she was the Chair of
the Board of the ACLU Women's Rights project in the late '60s and
early '70s, when this theory was being developed, was to seek to have
sex declared a suspect classification and therefore make sex-based
discrimination subject to strict scrutiny and therefore, to have most
sex-based classifications struck down." In 1971 in Reed v. Reed,"
sex-based discrimination was in fact struck down, although the Court
32. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (pointing out that economic disparity
between the sexes is caused by a "long history of discrimination against women") (citing
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)).
33. SeeFrontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17 (1973) (asserting that women have been underrepre-
sented in the political process at the state as well as the federal levels).
34. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (finding no fundamental
right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy and denying homosexuals strict scrutiny review);
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1641 (1996) (using the rational relationship test to determine
whether homosexuals' rights as persons were violated).
35. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (upholding the state court's
use of rational review in deciding whether an illegitimate child's equal protection rights were
violated).
36. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all governmen-
tal racial classifications must be analyzed under strict scrutiny).
37. I at 227.
38. See Kupetz supra note 15 at 1360 (noting that now-Justice Ginsburg used strict scrutiny
analysis in her brief for Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1970) as part of her strategy for the Women's
Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union).
39. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
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was unclear about whether it was using strict scrutiny in fact. It used,
in many ways, "rational basis" language.'
Two years later in Frontiero,4' a plurality of the Court-four Jus-
tices-said yes, strict scrutiny is required; sex is the same as race for
the purposes of this analysis.' However, since then we have never
reached by five Justices voting for strict scrutiny, instead, the Court
essentially has taken a middle-tier scrutiny, also known as intermedi-
ate scrutiny. The clearest articulation of intermediate scrutiny was in
1976 in Craig v. Boren,' when the Court held that sex is considered a
classification that requires heightened scrutiny." Under that height-
ened scrutiny, to be upheld, the classification need only be
substantially related to an important state interest'-substantially,
not narrowly tailored, and an important state interest, not a compel-
ling one. Among other things, this leaves the following anomaly in
the difference between race and sex discrimination: women of color
often face a dilemma because they have to be classified as one or the
other in order to figure out what the right level of analysis is for
them. But the Court has not had to deal with that anomaly at all.
By 1982, Justice O'Connor had made intermediate scrutiny her
own. She adopted and used it in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,' in which a man challenged Mississippi University for
Women, a state-institution nursing school program which did not
admit men.47 Justice O'Connor struck that program down under
intermediate scrutiny." She suggested, though, in her opinion, that
the issue of what is the appropriate level of scrutiny and what is the
appropriate analysis for sex discrimination was actually still open."
40. See id. ("[T]he question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex
of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state
objective .... ").
41. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
42. Id. at 682 (Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall formed the fourjustice
plurality).
43. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
44. Id. at 197 ("[T]o withstand constitutional challenges, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives.").
45. Id.
46. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
47. See id.at719-21.
48. See id. at 728-30 (finding that MUW's policies violated the Equal Protection Clause
because (1) they did not "intentionally and directly assist" women; and (2) the state did not
show that the classification furthered a "compensatory objective" in educating women).
49. See id. at 724 n.9. Justice O'Connor's footnote reads, in part, as follows:
Our past decisions establish, however, that when a classification expressly discrimi-
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O'Connor's hint was picked up by Justice Ginsburg once she was
appointed to the Court. For example, in a Title VII case in which
there was no need to address the constitutional issue, Justice Gins-
burg dropped a footnote completely unnecessarily,' stating that this
question was still open." Justice Ginsburg clearly wanted to make this
point. She raised the same point again in 1994 infE.B.,2 a constitu-
tional case.
In the meantime, during all of this period, we still did not get strict
scrutiny analysis for sex-based classifications. We had heightened
scrutiny and a number of sex discrimination statutes were struck
down, though not all of them." Statutory rights established by Con-
gress were getting women pretty close to strict scrutiny in a number
of contexts governed by those statutes, most important Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which protects women from sex discrimina-
tion in employment, ' and Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, which protects women from discrimination in federally funded
education programs.' So, in those contexts, the statutory rights had
nates on the basis of gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine
the validity of the classification do not vary simply because the objective appears ac-
ceptable to individual Members of the Court. While the validity and importance of
the objective may affect the outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself does not
change.
Thus, we apply the test previously relied upon by the Court to measure the constitu-
tionality of gender-based discrimination. Because we conclude that the challenged
statutory classification is not substantially related to an important objective, we need
not decide whether classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect.
(citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,13 (1975)).
50. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 26 n. * (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring).
51. Id. ("Indeed, even under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, which requires
'an exceedingly persuasive justification' for a gender-based classification, Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted), it remains an open question
whether 'classifications based upon gender are inherently suspect.' See Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982)").
52. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n. 6 (1994) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 26
n. *) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (considering "whether peremptory challenges based on
gender stereotypes" considerably assist a party's attempt to ensure a fair and impartialjury).
53. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that an Idaho statute, which
provides that where males and females are equally qualified to administer estates, males must
be preferred, violates the Equal Protection Clause under heightened scrutiny); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding that an Oklahoma statute which had disparate drinking ages
for men and women was unconstitutional); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977)
(holding that gender-based distinctions against female wage earners under Social Security
violated the Equal Protection Clause); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,391 (1979) (holding
a sex-based distinction in a New York Domestic Relations law provision invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause).
54. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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gone probably about as far as strict scrutiny would have gone-in-
deed further, since they covered private action as well as state
action.' The question, as a practical matter at least for me as a prac-
titioner-of whether we were ever going to get strict scrutiny was
becoming more and more symbolic. Of course, there was also the
Equal Rights Amendment, which failed to pass the number of states
required for ratification. 7 Passage of the ERA would essentially have
given strict scrutiny to sex-based governmental classifications.' Nev-
ertheless, as a practical matter, heightened scrutiny and the statutory
protections against discrimination were getting women pretty far.
The symbolic question, though, remained an important one and had
never really been resolved.
Last term, the Court decided in Adarand that as strict scrutiny is to
be applied to statutes that discriminate against blacks and other
ethnic minorities, it should also be applied to classifications that
worked to the detriment of whites, essentially to affirmative action
programs.' And that left a real anomaly. Present law, post-Adarand,
holds that race-based affirmative action--"reverse" discrimination
against whites, to use the Court's language-is harder to justify than
sex-based discrimination-that is, discrimination against women.
Do they really mean that? And do they really mean another logical
extension of Adarand-that, as a few courts have held sex-based
affirmative action is harder to justify than sex-based discrimination by
applying Adarand and its strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs
that discriminate against men, but still not applying strict scrutiny to
discrimination against women.
Well, then, along comes VAi. 6' Here is a real live example of
something that has not been reached by Title IX and that requires a
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1994) ("[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin."); See also 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) ("[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.. .).
57. In 1982, the deadline for ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment ran, but with
only 35 of the required 38 states having ratified it. See HOFF supra note 8, at 401.
58. See HOFF, supra note 8, at 125 (quoting the basic text of the ERA as: "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of sex.").
59. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
60. Seeidat227.
61. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that a gender
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constitutional analysis. It requires somebody to look at the constitu-
tionality of this state action.' Debbie [Brake] knows much more
about the details of the case, and I am going to let her talk about
them as she also talks about some of the lower court decisions. But
the context of VMT is that first, it is a case with "great facts"-in that
there is blatant discrimination in which women are clearly disadvan-
taged and do not get the benefits that their male counterparts get,
benefits that are clearly provided by the state.' Whatever you think
of those benefits, women don't get them and men do. Second, we
are in the position of having as sympathetic a Court as we are likely to
see; and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is on this Court. If anybody is
going to be able to get Justice O'Connor as a fifth vote for strict
scrutiny for sex discrimination, presumably it is Justice Ginsburg.
Third, we have an administration willing to make the argument that
sex-based discrimination ought to be viewed with strict scrutiny. And
finally, we have the circumstance that this comes up right after Ada-
rand," which squarely presents the anomaly between the Court's
treatment of race and sex discrimination.
It seems a great opportunity to try to convince the Court that gen-
der classifications should get strict scrutiny at last. However, in VM,
how could we convince the Court to use strict scrutiny when we could
in all likelihood win the MP case with intermediate scrutiny? We
certainly weren't going to concede that under intermediate scrutiny,
VMI's program was constitutional. Of course, effectively, that is what
happened in the lower courts.' The lower courts upheld, under
their application of intermediate scrutiny, the separate program that
Virginia set up, which was called the Virginia Women's Institute for
Leadership-a program that was at a separate campus, did not confer
the same engineering and science degrees that VMI did, and that
uses a quite a different educational methodology, specifically de-
signed for women-which was supposed to be a kind of soft,
distinction isjustifiable in this instance if "adequate alternatives" are available to women), aff'd
44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), reu'd 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
62. See id. at 890.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1415-43 (W.D. Va. 1991), affd 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), af'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), revd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
64. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (evaluating statute awarding ten percent of federal
contract funds to "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" considered to be
minorities and women).
65. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992).
66. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1233 (4th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 6:1
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touchy-feely leadership growth experience for women, as opposed to
the rigorous, adversarial, educational methodology that VMI uses.'
Surely that blatant difference ought to fail under even intermedi-
ate scrutiny. We certainly wanted to make that argument, and we
thought we would win that argument. So how and why should the
Court take the next step and apply strict scrutiny? This is really a
species of the larger problem that is posed by this panel, which is
what does strict scrutiny get us that intermediate scrutiny does not?
How is strict scrutiny going to help us at this point? The answer that
we came up with, in our briefs to the Court, was to say that interme-
diate scrutiny is essentially unworkable, as VMt3 illustrated. Look at
how much trouble the lower courts have had with intermediate
scrutiny.'
Debbie Brake is going to tell you more about this trouble the lower
courts have had with intermediate scrutiny," and because of the
lower courts' trouble, we argued, the Court needs to lead the way, to
establish strict scrutiny once and for all, so that this confusion and
litigation and the awful results that we have had so far with interme-
diate scrutiny won't recur. Essentially we are saying, "Look, you tried
calling it something less than the real thing, but it is not working, and
let's just do this right once and for all. And here is a perfect example
of why you need to do it."
I will tell you that at the oral argument in VMl'one's hopes for the
Court's adopting this line of reasoning were dashed-dashed hard,
actually, against the rocks. Justice O'Connor, whose vote we need,
basically said to Paul Bender-the attorney for the government-in a
not very friendly tone, 'Why do I even have to get to this question of
strict scrutiny? We have decided this. Why are you even bringing it
up?" To which Mr. Bender replied, 'Vell, you know, you have left it
open." Justice O'Connor then answered, "What are you talking
about? We have not." ' Essentially, of course, it is her footnote that
leaves it open."" And Justice Ginsburg did not jump into the breach
67. See i&. at 1233-35.
68. See Brief Amid Curiae of National Women's Law Center, et. al., United States v. Vir-
ginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941), available in 1995 WL 703392 (Nov. 16, 1995).
69. See infrapp. 13-21.
70. See infra pp. 13-21.
71. See Petitioner's Oral Argument, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996),
available in 1996 WL 16020, 10-11 (paraphrasing official court transcript).
72. Seesupranote 49.
73. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9 (1982) (stating that
because this case did not pass intermediate scrutiny muster, the Court need not decide whether
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to say in her very understated way, 'Vell, actually, we have kind of left
it open. Don't you remember?"74 Maybe that is because she didn't
want to embarrass Justice O'Connor and figured that she was going
to have plenty of opportunity to do it later, in the gym or the bath-
room or wherever they have such discussions. I hope that was what
she was thinking. But she did not leave a lot of room for hope along
those lines.
Even if we got strict scrutiny, it is not a panacea. Let me talk a mi-
nute about what strict scrutiny won't do under the Constitution. The
first thing that strict scrutiny will not do is regulate private action. It
is only state action that we are talking about; there must be govern-
mental discrimination to begin with.' Another thing that strict
scrutiny will not do is establish that there is sex discrimination to
begin with. In order to even get to the level of scrutiny, you have to
convince the Court that there is discrimination." Geduldig," for
example, would not be overturned, even if strict scrutiny were to be
adopted. In fact, in my more optimistic days before the VM! argu-
ment I had been thinking of VMI as step one: first, let's get to strict
scrutiny, and then after we do that, we'll overturn Geduldig" Now, I
am less optimistic that we are ever going to get to that. So, in any
event, pregnancy-based classifications, and therefore abortion-based
classifications, are still, under constitutional doctrine, not even sex
discrimination to begin with and therefore not even subject to strict
scrutiny, even if it were required, a third limitation is that there is
also no disparate-impact analysis under the Constitution, whether we
have strict scrutiny or not.'
gender classifications are inherently suspect).
74. See supra note 49.
75. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978). See United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745,754 (1966).
76. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that California's disability insurance
program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to cover work loss resulting
from pregnancy. The Court held that a state may, without violating equal protection, address
itself to whatever problem it decides is most acute, neglecting others, in this case, disability
coverage for work loss due to pregnancy).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (the court noted that "our cases
have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact."); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (finding that a
study that showed that the death penalty in Georgia was imposed more often on black defen-
dants and killers of white victims failed to establish that any decision makers in defendant's case
acted with discriminatory purpose in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (holding that the
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Finally, even if we do get to strict scrutiny, what is the Court going
to mean by "compelling state interest?"8 And how is the addition of
sex discrimination to the pantheon of classifications that must be
justified by a compelling state interest going to affect the definition
of the term? For example, state interests to preserve privacy, to
preserve other constitutional rights, and to remedy past discrimina-
tion all have been held to be compelling state interests. And indeed,
in Adarand,810'Connor said that strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact, that
is even without gender-based classification being considered. So
presumably, there will still be things that will survive the strictest
scrutiny.
Certain affirmative action programs should survive the strictest
scrutiny under current race discrimination doctrine, and presumably
also under sex discrimination doctrine if we get to that point. And
there are a lot of things that we might be interested in preserving-
single sex women's education, for one. And you can imagine the
women's colleges were a little bit nervous about VMP2 itself, because
some of them were afraid that strict scrutiny would put them out of
business.
My bottom line on the question of whether the pros outweigh the
cons is yes, it is very easy to criticize a construct of equal constitu-
tional scrutiny when society hasn't caught up. Legal standards of
equality all too easily can be viewed as punishing women because
women are not, in fact, equal yet, but this is a kind of 1996 version of
why women are better off without strong rights. The logic says,
"don't worry, it's better for women to be protected than to have
rights." And I think it is really a mistake. Of course society hasn't
caught up, but do you give up and accept the status quo? That does
not seem to me to be an adequate solution either. We're talking
about a constitutional standard that is right for all times, even if there
isn't a lot of overt sex discrimination now, and even though we need
plaintiffs failed to show racially discriminatory intent or purpose when local authorities refused
to rezone a tract of land from single-family to multi-family when that rezoning was requested in
order to build racially integrated low and moderate income housing); Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973) (finding that intentionally segregated school board actions created
a prima facie case of unlawful segregated design on the part of school authorities); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1964) (finding that plaintiffs failed to prove racially discrimina-
tory intent or motivation in apportionment of congressional districts in New York County);
Hernandez v. NewYork, 500 U.S. 352, 372-73 (1991) (holding that the prosecutor's reasoning
behind striking two Hispanic prospective jurors was racially neutral).
80. SeeCraigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976).
81. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
82. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), af'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), affld, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996).
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affirmative action and remedial action. In ten to twenty years the
landscape may be very different, and the need for a tough standard
to deal directly with discrimination against women as a backstop to
any backsliding-to all of the backsliding that we expect - I think
outweighs the potential losses that we might see even if we got some
strict scrutiny. Debbie, do you want to pick up from here?
MS. BRAKE: Good afternoon. I'm Deborah Brake with the Na-
tional Women's Law Center. I want to talk about what I would call
the misuse, or abuse, of intermediate scrutiny in the lower courts,
with an eye towards asking the same question Donna [Lenhoff] is
asking. And that is, should the correct standard be one of strict
scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny? I do want to make clear
that I strongly believe the examples that I am going to talk about are
misapplications of intermediate scrutiny. I don't believe that under a
proper reading of intermediate scrutiny these cases should have
come out the way that they have come out in the lower courts. But,
like Donna [Lenhoff], I think we need a constitutional standard that
is clear for the lower courts. I think a constitutional standard should
be one that is likely to be interpreted correctly and one that is ap-
propriate in the long haul.
When intermediate scrutiny was first developed in Craig v. Boreni
in 1976,Justice Rehnquist, not surprisingly, dissented from the opin-
ion. Of course, his conclusion was that sex discrimination should
receive the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny rather than the
highest. But in talking about the intermediate scrutiny standard and
criticizing it, he stated that intermediate scrutiny is "so diaphanous
and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices." 4
This may be the first and last time that I quote Justice Rehnquist on a
sex discrimination issue approvingly. But I think if we look at what
has happened in the lower courts, to some extent, this has been the
case. It is a little difficult for judges to determine whether a state
interest is important enough to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. It is
even more difficult for judges to determine whether the gender
classification is substantially related to that important governmental
interest. There is some fudge room in deciding what is substantially
related to an important state interest.
In talking about the lower courts I want to focus on the VMP case,
both because it is at the forefront of the consciousness of sex dis-
83. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
84. Id. at 221.
85. 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), affd in part and reu'd
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crimination law right now, having been argued before the Supreme
Court on January 17, 1996, and because it is a showcase example of
the misuse of intermediate scrutiny and of judges letting gen-
der-based stereotypes infect their thinking and their analysis of
whether a gender classification is substantially related to an impor-
tant state interest.
First, I will briefly discuss some of the history of the VMP case.
This case was brought by the United States government as the Plain-
tiff after the government received several hundred letters of inquiry
from young women or the parents of young women who were inter-
ested in attending the Virginia Military Institute, which is based in
Lexington, Virginia. If any of you have been out that way in central
Virginia or have spent any time in the state government in Rich-
mond, you know that VMI is an extremely prestigious institution in
the state of Virginia and that many of the most powerful people in
the state have some connection with that institution. It has been a
stepping-stone to power in Virginia, and nationally as well. It is a very
highly recognized and regarded school.
The U.S. government sued Virginia under the equal protection
clause. I think Donna mentioned that the case was not brought
under Tide IX, which is the federal law that prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in federally funded education programs, because Title IX
exempts undergraduate institutions that are traditionally and histori-
cally single-sexY Thus, the case was brought under the Constitution
and under an intermediate scrutiny analysis. And it has gone
through several stages of litigation. The first district court opinion
was issued a few years ago in 1991Y The district court said that VMI's
exclusion of women was constitutional because single gender educa-
tion was pedagogically justifiable and because the admission of
women would destroy the very unique nature of VMIY That decision
was appealed to the Fourth Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit reversed.
But it agreed with the district court's finding that single gender
education, in itself, was pedagogically justifiable-i.e., an important
state interest-and agreed that the admission of women would de-
stroy what is fundamentally unique about the Virginia Military
in part, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
86. Id.
87. 20 U.S.C. §1681(a)(5).
88. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 891
(1992).
89. Id. at 1411-15.
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Institute.' But the Fourth Circuit nevertheless found that there was
no real rationale for denying women the same benefits that the state
had chosen to provide men-that is, there was nothing equivalent for
women who wanted a military education in the state because women
couldn't go to VMI.' And VMI was the only game in town, basically,
in the state of Virginia. So the Fourth Circuit said that the state had
three options.' The state could choose to make VMI a private insti-
tution, in which case there would be no state action, so it would not
fall under the equal protection requirementsY Second, it could
admit women,' or third, it could create a separate, parallel program
for women that would give women the benefits of a VMI education.'
Or, in lieu of these three alternatives, the court suggested, the state
could seek a more creative option.
The state chose the last alternative and created the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership, or VWIL, which looks absolutely
nothing like the Virginia Military Institute.' VWIL is attached to
Mary Baldwin College, a small, private liberal arts women's college
which is in Stanton, Virginia, thirty miles away from VMIY. VWIL is
not based on the military model on which VMI is based." VWIL does
not have the adversative method, or whatJustice Breyer called in oral
argument in the Supreme Court, "[T]hat adversative thing."'  At
VWIL, you cannot get an engineering degree or a bachelor of sci-
ence degree because Mary Baldwin does not offer those degrees. At
VMI, on the other hand, you can get an engineering degree and a
bachelor of science degree.
There is no barracks life or military training at VWIL other than
the ROTC' program, which you can get in virtually any college
around the country.'' And perhaps, most importantly, all of the
90. United States v. Virginia, 976 F. 2d 890, 897-899 (4th Cir. 1992).
91. See id. at 899-900.
92. Id. at 900.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. United States v. Virginia, 976 F. 2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992).
96. SeeUnited States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1233 (4th Cir. 1995), affd in part and reu'd in
part 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
97. See id.
98. Seeid.
99. 1996 WL 16020, at 20 (U.S. Oral Arg.)
100. Reserve Officer Training Corps
101. See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234 (4th Cir. 1995), affd in part and rev'd,
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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intangible things that go into making an institution great will be very
different for VWIL than they are for VMI."° VMI has the largest
endowment of any school in the country on a per student basis.' It
has been around for over 150 years."' It is extremely prestigious, and
has some of the most highly placed alumnae of any school in the
country, particularly in the state of Virginia."5 No brand new institu-
tion, regardless of its merit, is going to be able to measure up to that.
It simply doesn't have all of those intangible characteristics that make
VMI unique.
The state of Virginia, in justifying what it had created for women,
was not in the position to argue that these things were the same. And
in fact, they did not argue that these things were the same. Instead,
they argued that the differences between the two programs were
justified by the gender-based differences between men and women,
and that even though these two programs were different, the differ-
ences are justified because women and men are different." Because
Virginia believed that VMI would not work for most women, it cre-
ated VWIL, which Virginia's experts said would work for most
women.
I want to read to you, just to make this a little more concrete, some
of these gender-based differences that the district court relied on.
These are all direct quotes from the district court's summary of the
state's experts' testimony to the district court to justify the differences
between the two programs:
'Young women, by the time they reach college, have less confi-
dence in themselves than men. Young women do not need to have
uppitiness and aggression beaten out of them.""'
102. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892-893 (4th Cir. 1992).
103. See David M. Henry, VM9 Faces Another Tough Battle in the Equal Protection War as U.S.
Challenges School's Men Only Policy, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, April 16, 1996, at 2064 ("[VMI] has an
endowment of $131 million... . Based on future commitments, the endowment is projected
to rise to more than $350 million"); Lucile M. Ponte, United States v. Virginia: ReinforcingArchaic
Stereot)pes About Women in the Military Under the Flawed Guise of Educational Diversity, 7 HASrINGS
WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 72 & n. 481 (1996) (noting that Mary Baldwin College [MBC] has an endow-
ment of $19 million with commitments for $35 million more. However, this amount includes
all MBC, notjust VWIL).
104. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992).
105. See id. at 892-93 (alumni include General of the Army, George C. Marshall, and six
alumni have received the Congressional Medal of Honor). See Henry, supra note 104, at 2064
(noting that Thomas "Stonewall"Jackson, a VMI professor, was a famous confederate General
during the Civil War).
106. See id. at 895-97.
107. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 480 (N.D. Va. 1994), affd 44 F.3d 1229
(4th Cir. 1995), aff'd inpart and rev'd inpart, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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"[A]norexia is rampant among young college women, in part be-
cause they doubt themselves and so they want to exercise control."'03
"[W]omen do not need the leveling experience of a rat line and
adversative methods [because] women are generally raised with a
lower self-image than men."'
"Due to sex-based developmental differences, males tend to need
an atmosphere of adversativeness or ritual combat in which the
teacher is a disciplinarian and a worthy competitor, while females
tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere in which the teacher is
emotionally connected with the students.""
"If we were to place men and women into the adversative relation-
ship inherent in the VMI program, we would destroy, at least for that
period of adversative training, any sense of decency that still perme-
ates the relationship between the sexes.""
"If VMI marches to the beat of a drum, then Mary Baldwin
marches to the melody of a fife ....
"Aggressiveness and fear of failure are not incentives that propel
women to want to succeed and to achieve success to the same extent
as in males."".
"Women are not capable of the ferocity requisite to make the pro-
gram work. And they are also not capable of enduring without
psychological trauma if they went through the rat program.".
"Women basically have not the same threshold on emotion as men
do. They break down emotionally."" 5
"In the rat line, with a bunch of upperclassmen all over her, a
woman would break down crying."".
"Even those women who are more macho than that would not
make up a cohort who would be able to deal with rats and the invari-
ant way that VMI now deals with rats.""7
108. Id.
109. Id. at 481 n.10.
110. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991).
111. Id. at 480-81.
112. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 484.
113. Id. at 480-81.
114. Id
115. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 481 n.10.
116. Id
117. Id.
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'VMI would be inappropriate for women because women develop
through a relationship of connection and a sense of community
rather than through self-discipline and self-reliance.'. 8
And my personal favorite:
"Admission of women would impair the VMI system because of the
dating and young women's aspirations to marry that are still, in the
South, very common. '".9
Well, I guess we in the North know better. In an opinion that sur-
prised a lot of people, the Fourth Circuit upheld the VWIL program
as constitutional, and applied what it called a special intermediate
scrutiny test.2 There were three parts to this special intermediate
scrutiny test. The first part of the test asked whether the state's objec-
tive in providing single-gender education was a legitimate
government objective."' The second part of the test asked whether
the classification adopted by the state-that is, the exclusion of men
from VWIL and the exclusion of women from VMI-was substantially
related to the state purpose of providing single-gender education."
As you can see, the first two parts of the test are automatically satis-
fied by any single-gender program, regardless of the reasons
underlying the exclusion of women from the program. The third
part of the test asks whether the educational benefits provided to
men and women are substantively comparable." The court held that
in the case of VMI and VWIL they were.'24
There are a number of problems in the way the Fourth Circuit in-
terpreted intermediate scrutiny here. The first problem is that it
significantly watered down the first prong of traditional intermediate
scrutiny analysis by asking only whether the state interest was legiti-
mate rather than important." And in talking about whether it was
legitimate, the Court basically equated a legitimate interest with one
that was not pernicious.' Thus, the court accepted single-gender
education itself as the legitimate state interest, mistaking the gender
classification for the permissible state objective. So then, at that
118. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 480-81.
119. Id
120. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890-92 (4th Cir. 1992).
121. Id. at 895-97.
122. Id. at 897-99.
123. Id. at 898-99.
124. Id at 898-900.
125. United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d at 895-97.
126. Id.
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point, the question of whether the classification is substantially re-
lated is a pretty illusory test because you are asking if the classification
is substantially related to itself. The court found that the exclusion of
women and the exclusion of men from each institution is substan-
tially related to the state's interest in providing single-gender
education.
The Court proceeded to the third part of the test, which simply
requires that the two programs provide substantively comparable
benefits. " In analyzing whether the two programs were substantively
comparable, the Court first compared the goals of the two programs
and it defined the goals of the two programs very broadly, finding
them similar because each program wanted to develop leaders and
educated citizens. The Court found that the goals were substantially
comparable.
The Court next looked at the means of attaining the programs'
goals and, in evaluating the means, acknowledged that the means
were very different, but found that each programs' means worked
best for the gender it served, based again on group generalizations
and approving of the district court's reliance on the gender stereo-
types that I just read you. The Fourth Circuit also found that there
was no demand for a women's VMI, so that it was permissible for
women as a group to be channeled into this VWIL program) 8 But
there are a couple of problems with looking at "demand" in this way.
One is, how do you measure demand in a context where there is
discrimination and lack of opportunity?
VMI spends significant amounts of money dredging up demand for
men by going to high schools, recruiting, and having powerful male
alumni talk to the male recruits. Through its history, accomplish-
ments and continuing efforts, VMI has created a demand for itself
among men. This has never been done for women. Women have
never been admitted to VMI, so measuring demand for a women's
VMI in that context is, at best, speculative. Making women's admis-
sion to VMI contingent upon the demand for VMI among women as
a group would simply perpetuate that discrimination.
It is particularly odd that the court accepted Virginia's assertion of
a lack of demand for a women's VMI given that over three hundred
women had written to the United States government expressing their
interest in attending VMI in the two years prior to the litigation."
127. Id. at 898-99.
128. United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 481 n.12.
129. United States v. Virginia, 976 F. 2d 890, 894 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Another problem with the Fourth Circuit's rationale is that the fo-
cus on the absence of demand by women as a group, as ajustification
for denying a woman's individual rights is contrary to the very es-
sence of equal protection law under the Constitution. The Supreme
Court, as Donna mentioned, especially in some of the later cases like
J.E.B. v. Alabama' and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,"'
ruled that a state cannot use gender as a proxy for group generaliza-
tions, and cannot take away someone's individual rights by telling
them that 'Well, women aren't supposed to want that," or "Not
enough women want that, therefore you can't have that
state-sponsored benefit. '' s"
I think it is very clear to all of us that this case would not have come
out the same way under strict scrutiny. Even before Brown v. Board of
Education," which held that separation of the races in schooling is
inherently unequal, this inequality accepted by the Fourth Circuit in
the VMT would not have been accepted under the "separate but
equal" doctrine established in the race-discrimination context. This
doctrine originated in Plessy v. Ferguson', which held that separate
facilities and/or travel accommodations for different races are per-
missible as long as they are equal, because the separation does not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other.
A case decided in 1950, four years before Brown v. Board of Educa-
tione" struck down the separate but equal doctrine as applied to race
and applied a much stronger equal protection scrutiny to race dis-
crimination than the Fourth Circuit applied to sex-based
discrimination in VMT. The state in Sweatt v. Painte?' attempted to
exclude African-Americans from the state law school, while creating a
separate law school for African-Americans. The Supreme Court
ruled that such a separate school would not be equal because even if
130. 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by
state actors in use of peremptory strikes injury selection violates equal protection).
131. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that policy of state-supported university, which limited its
enrollment to women, of denying otherwise qualified males to enroll for credit in its nursing
school violates equal protection dause).
132. Id. at 724-25 (explaining that gender-based classifications cannot be based on "fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females," or on "archaic and stereotypic
notions" with the purpose of excluding or "protecting" members of one gender because "they
are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior."); accord, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), supplemented by 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
134. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
135. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
136. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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you could create the same resources, the same qualifications of
teachers and everything else to make the program equal, the intangi-
ble qualities that make an institution great could never be
replicated.'
Another example of intermediate scrutiny gone wrong is the
Fourth Circuit's decision in the Citadet" case, where again the Fourth
Circuit suggested that a separate women's program might be consti-
tutional, and said that even though an absence of group demand
might not justify depriving women of their socio-political rights, it
might justify denying some economic benefits such as education.'
There is no citation for this statement of the Fourth Circuit by the
Citadel case. But, again, it shows that the courts have more leeway to
misinterpret intermediate scrutiny than strict scruiny."
Where does this leave us? I think certainly intermediate scrutiny
itself, at least as applied by the Supreme Court in recent years, is a
standard that has a lot of teeth to it. But because the Court has not
gone that extra step and adopted strict scrutiny, the lower courts have
a lot more room to import their own prejudices and biases in deter-
mining the existence of a relationship and the importance of the
state interest involved.'
4
'
And with that in mind, I will turn it over to the next panelist to talk
about how intermediate scrutiny has worked in other areas.
PROF. SCHNEIDER: Hi. I'm Liz Schneider and I am very happy
to be here. I want to thank Ann Shalleck for inviting me. I know that
this panel is a particularly important way to celebrate your Centen-
nial because of American University Law School's history with respect
to women in legal education. The Women and the Law Program that
Ann [Shalleck] directs has been very important to many law teachers
and other programs around the country in facilitating discussion of
gender issues in legal education. For this reason, I am especially
delighted to be here.
Today I want to provide an overview on the history of litigation on
and theory about equal protection and intermediate scrutiny over the
last twenty-five years and comment on the previous presentations. I
137. Id at 634 (citing such qualities as reputation of the faculty, experience of the admini-
stration, prestige, traditions, position and financial support from alumni).
138. Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding state-supported male-only
military college has to admit female student to comply with the Equal Protection Clause).
139. Id at 445.
140. Id
141. SeeCraigv. Boren, 429 U.S. at 221.
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agree with many of the views expressed by the previous panelists-
that intermediate scrutiny has substantial teeth, if applied properly,
but allows lower courts to import their prejudices; that VMI could
easily be decided on grounds of intermediate scrutiny, and that the
race-sex analogy is problematic. I want to offer some additional
perspectives on the problem, and raise some questions that I hope we
can discuss at the end as we open the panel to dialogue with all of
you.
I think about the last twenty or twenty-five years of intermediate
scrutiny very concretely. As a law student I worked on many of the
cases that we're talking about now -Reed v. Reed," Frontiero v.
Richardson,14 and then, as a lawyer, on Craig v. Boren."M  There is no
question in my mind that, historically, the struggle to have gender
treated as strict scrutiny was, as Ann suggested in her introductory
comments, a crucial aspect of the political history of the second wave
of the American women's movement in the 1960's.'" The move for
strict scrutiny of gender also grew out of and built on the experience
and treatment of racial discrimination, as a vehicle for political analy-
sis of gender." This link was not only intellectual but political and
personal, for the women's movement in the 1960's had emerged out
of the civil rights struggle.14 1 Many women's rights activists saw a close
political connection between issues of racism and sexism, even
though we now recognize that the analogy of race and gender is
problematic.
The evolution of strict scrutiny over the last twenty years, however,
raises important questions for us to consider concerning increasingly
complex understandings of gender discrimination and the intersec-
tion of gender and other forms of discrimination.
First, I don't think there is any question that the Supreme Court's
arti-ulatin n f intemediat. sr,utiny in Craigwas a pure compromise.
142. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding Idaho statute, providing that as between
persons equally qualified to administer estates, males must be preferred to females to violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
143. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding statutes providing that spouses
of male members of military are dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarters
allowances and medical/dental benefits, but spouses of female members are not unless they
are dependent for over one-half of support to violate the Due Process Clause).
144. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender-based classifications must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives in a case where the court decided that an Oklahoma statute prohibiting sale of
3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18 denied males
between 18 and 21 years of age equal protection of the laws).
145. See supra pp. 1-3 and accompanying notes (comments ofProfessorAnn Shalleck).
146. See supra pp. 1-3 and accompanying notes (comments ofProfessorAnn Shalleck).
147. See supra pp. 1-3 and accompanying notes (comments of Professor Ann Shalleck).
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Clearly a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson supported
suspect classification."* There were not enough Justices to get strict
scrutiny, so they settled on intermediate scrutiny as a compromise.
But from the beginning of the Court's treatment of gender discrimi-
nation, it was clear that the Court's characterization of the standard
was not the same as what it did in applying that standard. In Reed v.
Reed,'" the first case in which the Supreme Court held that gender
was within the purview of equal protection, the Court said that it was
applying a rational relationship standard when it struck down the
mandatory preference for male executors in the Idaho statute.'5 This
preference, however, was likely to be viewed as highly rational in
1971. This contradiction between what the Court says it is doing and
what it actually does has continued to characterize the Supreme
Court's treatment of gender.
I agree with others on the panel that intermediate scrutiny has not
gone far enough. Intermediate scrutiny has been misapplied by the
lower courts, and has not sufficiently emphasized the serious harm of
gender discrimination. In addition, since the Court ruled that preg-
nancy was outside the reach of equal protection in Geduldig v. Aiello,'
equal protection has not touched core issues of gender discrimina-
tion.
Others on this panel have already addressed the problems of
analogizing gender to race for purposes of strict scrutiny. One criti-
cal problem is that this analogy of gender to race assumes that
gender and race are distinct categories, and does not take account of
the problem of intersectionality and of multiple experiences of dis-
crimination. As Sharon was talking about this issue, I thought about
work that I have been doing recently, which puts this problem of
intersectionality into some perspective-work in South Africa around
the development of the new South African Constitution. The equal-
ity provision of this Constitution covers virtually every kind of
discrimination: not only sex and gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orien-
tation and language, but birth, class, wealth, status, etc. In the South
African context, I have been working with others to consider how to
bring various dimensions of discrimination together in an
intersectional way.
148. 411 U.S. 677,678 (1973).
149. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
150. 1& at 75-77.
151. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that denial of disability insurance benefits for normal
work loss resulting from pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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VMT is an important case not only for some of the reasons sug-
gested by other panelists, but because issues of education and gender
are incredibly complex. Let me give you some examples.
As I have taught OMT over the last several years, many students
analogized the argument made by VMT concerning the "adversative"
training in the military context to their law school experience. Those
of you sensitive to problems of gender bias in legal education can, I
think, easily make this leap. The arguments made by V1MT concern-
ing the rigor of the "rat" system and the need for the military model
are similar to, for example, messages in law schools about the
"toughness" of the Socratic method. Significantly, this analogy was
raised and was the subject of much interest at the VMT oral argument.
Yet, strands of "difference" feminism arguably have inadvertently
supported the notion of the separate, supposedly more nurturing
women's environment, represented by VWIL.
I am a graduate of a women's college, Bryn Mawr College, and
wrote an article twenty-five years ago raising questions about the
degree to which elite women's colleges affirmatively addressed and
taught students to grapple with women's common experiences of
discrimination, across class, race, ethnicity.' Arguments now made
on behalf of VWIL are arguments not far off a continuum of argu-
ments that have been made regarding the importance of women's
colleges. Issues that now emerge around VMl'have been made more
complex because of deepening experiences with the problem of
gender bias, with male institutions and the way in which "difference"
feminism has been interpreted to mean a warm, fuzzy, feminist alter-
native.
The article also makes arguments that were made by 1/MT concern-
ing women's "lack of interest" in attending VMI, that Debbie referred
to, as important to rebut. We saw this similar argument about
women's "lack of interest" in the Sears' 3 case: that women didn't want
high paying, commission jobs selling appliances because they really
preferred to be selling non-commission lingerie. Powerful argu-
ments have been made in critiquing the claim of women's "lack of
152. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Our Failures Only Many: Bryn Mawr College and The Failure of
Feminism, in WOMEN IN SEXIST SOCIETY 419 (V. Gornick & B. Moran eds., 1971).
153. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I1. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding that Sears did not engage in a nationwide pattern or practice of sex
discrimination by failing to hire females for commission selling on the same basis as males, or
by failing to promote females into commission sales on same basis as males, and basing ded-
sion on females' purported lack of interest in such positions).
Fall 1997]
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
interest" in Sears concerning the fact that women make choices, not
in a vacuum, but in circumstances of enormous constraint.
I want, however, to question the assumption implicit in some of the
previous presentations that strict scrutiny inherently and necessarily
provides greater clarity and more workable legal doctrine to lower
courts. I have certainly made those same arguments, and supported
those arguments in the range of briefs submitted to the Supreme
Court in VM. But here, reflecting on twenty years of intermediate
scrutiny, I want to say that I am not sure that the assumption is true.
Even if strict scrutiny were applied to gender, even if we had a federal
Equal Rights Amendment, judicial interpretation of strict scrutiny by
lower courts would likely be watered down. There are numerous
examples of cases in which lower courts have upheld facial gender-
based classifications, in the face ofjudicial declarations of strict scru-
tiny or state Equal Rights Amendments purporting to do the same.'
Assuming that if the federal ERA had been ratified it would have
constituted strict scrutiny-which was certainly the argument that
women's rights advocates made to Congress and the rest of the coun-
try-even then the Fourth Circuit might not have held VMT's remedy
of separate schools to be unconstitutional.
Why? First of all, the notion of coherence in legal doctrine is
somewhat overdrawn. There is considerable unworkability in lower
court interpretations of intermediate scrutiny. It is not only or even
necessarily because of the inherent elasticity of the concept of "sub-
stantial governmental interest," or "important governmental
interest." Rather, it is because of profound judicial resistance to
understanding issues of gender discrimination in their complexity
and to eradicating gender discrimination. The doctrine of "compel-
ling state interest" is not, by definition, less elastic. Legal doctrine is,
to some degree, inherently elastic.
That does not minimize my commitment to strict scrutiny. But as
strategists, as thinkers, and for you in the audience who I hope will
continue the legacy of this law school in women's rights, I think it is
important to explore these questions.
Saying that strict scrutiny is the standard for gender discrimination
is certainly an important political and moral statement. However,
getting past that moral statement, it will still be the daily work of state
154. For example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 601 P.2d 572,574-76
(Cal. 1979), California's Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, upheld a state statutory rape
law that facially discriminated on the basis of sex. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
without using strict scrutiny. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464
(1981).
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and federal courts to determine what strict scrutiny means in con-
crete cases, and whether it will be applied rigorously and without the
baggage of stereotyping. The Fourth Circuit VMI opinion is rife with
that kind of stereotypical generalization. It is rife with that generali-
zation because of deep contradictions in the way that judges,
decision-makers and policy makers think about gender, in the confu-
sion of the biological and social, and in the way that feminist theory
and feminist articulation get misused by judges and turned around
and interpreted to reinforce the status quo.
Another example of this problem ofjudicial misuse is in an area in
which I have worked a great deal, the problem of what has been
called the "battered woman syndrome." 5 Feminist lawyers sought to
admit evidence of battering in a range of different cases in order to
explain women's experiences as reasonable. This evidence, however,
is frequently interpreted by judges in ways that contribute to the
pathologizing of women. Judicial evaluation of gender is more com-
plex than simply determining what standard of review should apply.
Gender is a complex area for judicial decision-making because of
the largely heterosexual structure of our culture. Notions of intimacy
between men and women shape the personal and political-shape
relationships, judicial attitudes and social generalizations. We see
this reflected in the concept-which has surfaced in intermediate as
well as strict scrutiny-that where there are "real differences" be-
tween the sexes, those differences are not reachable through equal
protection." We see the repetition of this "difference" rhetoric in
the form of height and weight requirements,"57 the notion of certain
jobs that women can not perform," and in the rationales for the
separate educational programs approved by the Fourth Circuit in
155. See generally, Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 477
(1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 213 (1992).
156. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding in
statory rape cases that because men and women were differently situated the discrimination at
issue was benign).
157. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977) (acknowledging that
evidence that one-third of the women between 18 and 79 would be excluded from employment
as correctional officers by virtue of the height requirement, one-fifth of the women would be
excluded by virtue of minimum weight requirement, and that only one and that two percent of
the men would be excluded by height and weight requirements establishes prima fade case of
discrimination but nonetheless holding that requirements were a bona fide occupational
qualification).
158. Id. at 334-37 (concluding that women are not suited to be prison guards where their
presence might encourage sexual assault by inmates).
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We are also seeing, and I do not think it is unrelated to VMI, an
extraordinary backlash concerning gender issues. ' I see this as part
of a resistance to a notion of gender interchangeability, a notion of
equal protection based on interchangeability of gender roles which is
very much at the heart of what strict scrutiny approaches have tried
to develop. For all these reasons, adoption of strict scrutiny as a
legal standard is increasingly complex.
Where does this leave us? It suggests that the issue of the standard
of review must be understood in light of the way in which law and
social attitudes deeply and dialectically interrelate. Even with all of
the questions I am raising, I still absolutely believe in the need for
strict scrutiny as firmly as I did twenty-five years ago. As a political
and moral statement, it is one of the ways in which we can help
change attitudes that will make judicial interpretation in concrete
contexts more careful, more thoughtful and more discerning.
Law, or the legal standard that is developed, whether strict or in-
termediate scrutiny, does not do this by itself. A judge who is
thoughtful and open to being educated can be rigorous with inter-
mediate scrutiny as well. It is important to continue to argue that
strict scrutiny is necessary. It is a crucial aspect of our work, of our
strategy. The point is, however, that strict scrutiny is not enough.
Only the efforts of lawyers like yourselves will determine whether the
promise of the standard of strict scrutiny is realized.
Thanks.
PROF. SHALLECK. Thank you to all of the panelists. And we have
a few minutes for questions or comments. Nancy.
SPEAKER: I would like to ask for comments from the practitioners
and the theorists about the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr
v. Lewin.'" Although people sort of colloquially know that the Hawaii
Supreme Court said something good about gay marriage, I do not
think most people, if they have not read the decision, know that the
Hawaii Supreme Court said that it was sex discrimination to prohibit
two men or two women from getting married. The decision had
nothing to do with gay people at all. Preventing two men or two
women from getting married was sex discrimination, and under the
159. See gsneraly, SusAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINsT AMERICAN
WOMEN (1991).
160. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding sex is a "suspect category" for equal protection
purpose under section of Hawaii's Constitution and classification based on sex is subject to
strict scrutiny test).
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Hawaii Supreme Court, it had to withstand strict scrutiny.' I am
wondering how from a theoretical standpoint you would respond to
that, and also whether those of you speaking as practitioners are
made unhappy by this decision that requires you to no longer say
that sex discrimination and gays and lesbians are two completely
separate issues.
MS. LENHOFF: I think I'll start. Having thought about this,
Nancy, you will not be surprised to know, I was delighted with the
decision because I felt it made my job easier. We can no longer
pretend that these are separate issues. As Liz [Schneider] said, what
is really going on here is not merely a matter of constitutional analy-
sis. Rather, the question is how judges view sex discrimination. One
of the reasons that the courts have been so nervous, one of the rea-
sons for the grand compromise of intermediate scrutiny, has been
precisely this-judges' fear of the consequences of truly striking
down sex discrimination. For example, if sex discrimination is un-
constitutional, then discrimination against abortions ought to be
unconstitutional. Geduldid' is wrong. Everybody knows it's wrong.
It's sophistry at best. So you achieved strict scrutiny, states would
have to have on equal protection grounds a compelling interest for
abortion restrictions.
They similarly would have to have a compelling state interest for
discrimination against gays and lesbians as this is also sex discrimina-
tion. That is also part of what is going on. In fact, I spent a fair
amount of my winter making sure that the various equal protection
briefs filed not only in VMI, but also in the Colorado Amendment II
case"s allowed for the arguments that equal protection analysis ap-
plies both to sex discrimination and to sexual orientation
discrimination. I was very interested in Sharon's [Rush] argument,"
that it might be better to analogize sexual orientation to race dis-
crimination does appear that a lot of what is going on is that the
resistance to a more searching scrutiny for sex discrimination is
concern about sexual orientation-based classifications. I think that
161. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63-66.
162. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that California's disability insurance
program did not violate the equal protection clause by refusing to cover work loss resulting
from pregnancy).
163. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding an amendment to Colorado's
Constitution prohibiting all legislative, executive orjudicial action designed to protect homo-
sexuals from discrimination violated the equal protection clause).
164. Due to a copyright conflict, Sharon Rush's comments are not included in this tran-
script. For a commentary by Professor Rush about this panel, please see Sharon Rush, Divesity:
the Red Hening of EqualProection, 6AM. U.J. GENDER& L. 41 (1997).
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sex and sexual orientation discrimination are going to rise and fall
together; that is the subtext, and the Hawaii case'" just puts that on
the table.
MS. BRAKE: I just want to say a word. I agree with what Donna
said. I sense from your question that you expected the practitioners
to want to distance themselves from the movement towards equal
rights based on sexual orientation.
SPEAKER: Well, there was a lot of that in the ERA debate.
MS. BRAKE: Right. In my opinion, I do not think that that is what
the women's legal community should be doing. It is not what my
organization or Donna's organization is doing. I think the two forms
of discrimination are very intertwined and mutually overlapping. I
acknowledge that there are differences, but certainly if you read the
far right attack on gay people, a lot of it is based on the same types of
sexist notions that are used against women. Namely, that these peo-
ple are stepping outside of their gender roles and not being
masculine the way they are supposed to be or feminine the way they
are supposed to be. And I think, although there are differences,
there are a lot of similarities. At a doctrinal level as well, I think at
sort of a simplistic level, it can be looked at as "sex-plus" analysis:
someone's gender plus the gender of the person they are attracted
to. This is not much different from a lot of the traditional sex dis-
crimination analysis.
Anyway, I just wanted to make clear that the National Woman's
Law Center and I think a lot of people today in the women's legal
community are very much in support of the movement toward equal-
ity based on sexual orientation.
PROF. SHALLECK- Unfortunately, we are out of time. I thank all
the panelists both for placing Craig v. Boren in historical perspective
and for identifying ways, twenty years later, to understand the signifi-
cance of the constitutional standard of intermediate scrutiny.
165. Baehr, 910 P.2d at 112 (Haw. 1996).
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